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Abstract
This paper is an exploration of the relationships among the firm's financial
structure, its choice of liquid asset holdings, and growth. We present a theoretical model of
the firm where external finance is costly and where retaining earnings as liquid assets
serves a precautionary motive. One of the predictions of this model is that a long-term
reliance on high levels of debt finance tends to be associated with high levels of liquid
asset holding. We test this empirically by estimating the determinants of liquid asset
holdings using panel data sets of Belgian and UK firms. We find evidence of a positive
relation between leverage and liquid asset holding. This result leads us to identify a
possible linkage from high debt to high liquidity to slow growth. In light of this we discuss
the possible implications of  the development of stock markets, private equity, and venture
capital markets.
Editorial
On May 27-28, 2002 the National Bank of Belgium hosted a Conference on  "New
views on firms' investment and finance decisions".  Papers presented at this
conference are made available to a broader audience in the NBB Working Papers
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This paper is an exploration of the relationships among the firm's financial structure, its 
choice of liquid asset holdings, and growth. The literature on the determinants of economic 
growth has long studied the role of financial development promoting growth.
2 The literature 
corporate finance provides some microeconomic underpinnings for this relationship in the 
form of a variety of partial equilibrium analyses showing how capital structure can effect the 
firm’s investment decisions and therefore its growth.
2 To date this literature has overlooked 
the channel between financial structure and growth that we examine here.  
 
Briefly, the central thesis of our paper is that in choosing to hold its assets in liquid form, the 
firm will often forego an opportunity to invest in an illiquid and, possibly riskier, project that 
promises a higher expected return. In so doing, the growth of the firm is slowed since high 
returns on assets will pave the way for future investments.  The decision to hold assets in 
liquid form may be motivated by a variety of considerations. Prominent among these is that 
liquid assets may allow the firm to invest in a more attractive growth opportunity that may 
present itself later (i.e., the option value of waiting to invest is high). The alternative reason 
that we focus on is a precautionary motive for keeping a high level of liquidity. Liquid assets 
provide a cushion that would allow the firm to survive a period of low earnings during which 
the firm might be unable to access capital markets or could do so only at a very high cost. 
The firm’s financial structure will affect this decision because the degree of leverage used by 
the firm will affect the likelihood that cash flows will be insufficient to cover debt service 
and other fixed charges. This creates a possible linkage from high debt to high liquidity to 
slow growth. 
 
We explore this idea in three way in what follows. First, we present the findings of a 
theoretical model of the firm where external finance is costly and where retaining earnings as 
liquid assets serves a precautionary motive. We study the policy that should be chosen by 
 
 
1 This literature goes back at least to Schumpeter (1942). More recently the theme has been explored in 
theoretical models of growth, e.g., Greenwood and Jovanovich (1990) and in the empirical literature on growth, 
which has documented positive correlations between growth rates and various measures of financial 
development, e.g., King and Levine (1993). 
2 For a recent contribution including a review of the earlier corporate finance literature see Anderson and 
Nyborg (2002).  2
managers maximizing shareholder wealth and discuss its implications for dividend policy 
and liquid asset holding. One of the predictions of this model is that a long-term reliance on 
high levels of debt finance tends to be associated with high levels of liquid asset holding. We 
then study the question empirically by estimating the determinants of liquid asset holdings 
using panel data sets of Belgian and UK firms. After controlling growth opportunities and 
other important factors we find evidence of a positive relation between leverage and liquid 
asset holding. This is consistent with the theoretical analysis we presented and goes against 
previous studies, which documented a negative relationship between leverage and levels of 
liquid asset holding. Finally, we discuss the implications of these results from a broader 
institutional perspective. In particular, we discuss the possible implications of the 
development of stock markets, private equity, and venture capital markets.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the previous literature is 
reviewed.  In section 3 we present the results of a theoretical analysis of a dynamic model of 
firm liquid asset holding. Section 4 is devoted to our empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses 
implications of the institutional development in light of our findings. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The finance literature on the corporate choice of liquid asset holding is not very large. Unlike 
the enormous literature on capital structure, the composition of the left hand side of company 
balance sheets has not attracted a great deal of attention. The reason for this is in part 
attributable to the classic propositions of  Modigliani and Miller establishing the irrelevance 
of financial structure and dividend decisions for the value of the firm and the cost of capital. 
For firms operating in an M&M world the assets of the firm will be composed of those 
investments available to the firm for which the net present value is positive. Firms can inflate 
their balance sheets by making zero NPV investments in liquid assets; however, there seems 
little reason to believe that firms would wish to do so on a systematic basis. That is, there 
will be no relationship between the firm’s preference for liquidity and capital structure or 
other firm characteristics. 
 
The enormous developments of the literature on corporate finance in the last twenty-five 
years have of course produced a plethora of ideas as to how capital structure does matter for 
the value of the firm and for the firm’s investment decisions. Potentially, agency effects of 
various kinds may create important reasons for holding liquid assets with the further 
implications of different patterns of corporate liquidity depending on capital structure or 
other firm characteristics. This was one of the messages of Myers’s original analysis of the 
corporate borrowing decision (Myers (1977)). By pointing out that problems of debt 
overhang (i.e., levered equity’s disincentive to invest in positive NPV projects) could be 
overcome with ‘financial slack’ he established an important incentive for maintaining liquid 
asset holding. This notion has been further reinforced by the subsequent corporate finance 
literature that has emphasized the reasons why tapping capital markets may be relatively 
costly compared to retaining earnings.
3 Furthermore, the literature on real options has 
emphasized the option value of waiting to invest
4. Thus maintaining liquid assets will be 
                                                 
3 This idea was developed more explicitly in Myers and Majluf (1984). It is also studied in this volume in the 
paper of Van Cayseele. 
4 For developments of this idea and references to the literature see Cassimon et.al., Butzen et.al. and Gérard and 
Verschueren all in this volume.    3
important for firms faced with growth opportunities whose expected return fluctuates over 
time. 
 
Other veins of the corporate finance literature have pointed toward possibly unfavourable 
effects of liquid asset holding. This is an implication of  asset substitution problem first 
identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  If levered equity holders have an incentive to 
engage in increasing the riskiness of assets, they can implement this only if the firm’s assets 
are sufficiently liquid to allow this transformation to take place. 
 
These positive and negative aspects of corporate liquidity have been studied together in a 
recent analysis by Myers and Rajan (1998).  Asset liquidity bestows a benefit in the sense 
that it makes it possible for the firm to seize unforeseen opportunities or to survive during 
periods of poor business conditions. However, liquidity has a disadvantage that it makes it 
difficult for firm insiders to commit to a given course of actions. Their analysis assumes that 
assets in place generate cash flows at dates t=1 and t=2.  They allow insiders to undertake 
non-contractible asset transformations at dates t=0.5 and t=1.5. The values of transformed 
assets are supposed to be appropriated entirely by firm insiders to the detriment of the firm's 
creditors. Asset liquidity is the proportion of the asset value that is retained upon 
transformation. They show that the debt capacity of the firm it typically non-monotonomic – 
firms with ‘excessively liquid’ can raise less debt than can a ‘less liquid’ firm. Rajan’s and 
Myers’ model is very stylised and their analysis is incomplete in many respects. However, 
they clearly identify a conflict of interests of debtholders and shareholders in regard to the 
degree of liquid asset holding.  
 
Recently, Morellec (2001) provides an interesting analysis of the implications of liquidity 
that develops the asset transformation theme. He considers a dynamic model of a levered 
firm whose net revenue, given a capital stock, follows a geometric Brownian motion. The 
firm benefits from leverage because of the tax shields they bestow.  He studies the firm-
closure decision of a levered firm and obtains closed-form expressions for the values of debt 
and of equity. He then considers the possibility that the firm can liquidate a fraction of the 
assets of the firm prior to closing the firm entirely. He shows that shareholders will generally 
do so and that given a level of nominal debt, this partial asset sale increases the value of 
equity and reduces the value of debt. Thus, ex ante, asset liquidity (i.e., the capacity to 
engage in asset sales) reduces the value of the firm and the debt capacity of the firm. 
Consequently, asset liquidity can result in underinvestment relative to the illiquid asset 
benchmark case.  
 
Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) present a theory of the choice of liquid assets when outside 
finance is costly. The basic motivation for holding liquid assets is the creation of financial 
slack which will allow firm insiders to pursue futures attractive investment opportunities 
when they present themselves (as in Myers and Majluf). They study this issue in a three 
period model. At time zero a firm with amount of funds available,  X  allocates these funds 
to an illiquid investment with a risky return, a liquid investment with a (low) riskless return, 
and dividends. At t=1, given the returns to initial investments, the shareholders issue, at a 
cost, an amount of debt and chooses a level of risky fixed investment. At time t=2 returns are 
paid our as a dividend and firm is dissolved. In this set-up we see that the motivation for 
holding liquid assets is to avoid issuing costly debt at time t=1.  
 
Kim, Mauer and Sherman explore their theory in an empirical study of U.S. industrial firms 
over the period from 1975 through 1995. Their measure of liquidity is the ratio of cash and 4
marketable securities to the book value of assets. They consider explanatory variables 
measuring growth opportunities, cash flow volatility, debt ratio, cash flow, and bankruptcy 
risk. They interpret their findings as supportive of their theoretical model. This is based 
principally upon the finding of a positive relationship between growth opportunities and 
liquidity. It is notable that they find a negative relationship between leverage and corporate 
liquidity for which their theoretical analysis offers no explanation. We will discuss their 
results again in Section 4 when we turn to our own empirical analysis. 
 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) also provide an empirical analysis of 
corporate holding of liquid assets.  Their sample covers U.S. non-financial firms during the 
1952-1994 period. Their results are similar to those of Kim et.al. In particular, they find a 
positive relationship with respect to growth opportunities (measures by market to book ratio 
or by R&D spending). One difference is that Opler et.al find that cash flow enters positively; 
whereas, Kim et.al. find a negative relation with cash flow. In agreement with Kim et.al., 
they find a negative relation between debt and corporate liquidity. We will return to this and 
other aspects of their analysis in Section 4 below. 
 
 
3. The Precautionary Motive for Corporate Liquidity
5
 
In this section we address the question: in a world where a firm may be exposed to persistent 
periods of relatively low (or high) cash flows and where accessing external capital markets is 
very costly what policy for paying out dividends or retaining earnings in the form of liquid 
assets will be in the interests of shareholders?  
 
Consider a firm with given productive capacity (assets in place). The firm may accumulate 
liquid assets as a reserve to service debt and other fixed flow costs. To capture in a simple 
way the idea that outside finance is costly we simply do not allow for new equity issues or 
issue of new debt. Assets in place generate cash flows following a diffusion with stochastic 
drift. Liquid assets have a return less than the rate used to discount future profits, and less 
than the mean drift of the firm's risky assets.  
 
Mathematically  dSt is the cash flow generated by assets in place, r is the discount rate, I is 
flow costs including debt service (i.e., debt is considered to be a perpetual bond with fixed 
interest). Then the technology is 
S
t t t dW dt dS σ ρ + =  
where t ρ  is a stochastic drift term, σ is cash flow volatility (a constant) and 
S
t dW is a 
Brownian motion. In order to reflect persistence in departures from ‘normal levels’ of cash 
flows we model the drift with mean reversion according to the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, 
 




t dW  is independent of 
S
t dW . Shareholders are risk neutral and maximize the present 
discounted value of dividends. 
 
                                                 
5 This section is based on unpublished joint work with Andrew Carverhill of Hong Kong University.  5
The difference between cash flows and cash outflows in the form of costs, debt service and 
dividends is accumulated in liquid assets belonging to the firm. So long as the cash flows 
plus liquid assets are sufficient to cover costs and debt service the firm is solvent. Otherwise 
the firm is bankrupt. In the case of bankruptcy the firm is instantaneously transferred to 
bondholders and the firm subsequently is operated as an all equity firm. 
 
We assume that there are no bankruptcy costs. We furthermore assume that the return on 
liquid assets is zero; however, this is just a convenience. Our results hold true if returns to 
liquid assets held by the firm is bounded above by the risk-free rate.
6 
 
In this set up there is no accumulation of risky assets, so that the firm's only investment 
choice concerns the amount of liquid assets which are to be held. Therefore, the cost of 
holding liquid assets is the pure time value of money (r), i.e., the loss associated with 
consuming later rather than earlier. The benefit of holding liquid assets is that in times of 
low cash flow the equity holders can survive to benefit from future dividends. The 
assumption that there is no accumulation of risky assets is technically important because it 
reduces the dimensionality of the dynamic programming problem to be solved for optimal 
dividend policy. As was mentioned above we assume that it is not possible to issue new 
equity. Again this is a simple way of modelling the costliness of external finance. At the cost 
of additional analytical complexity, it could be relaxed to assume equity can be issued but 
only at a positive marginal cost (‘hair cut’).  
 
Notice that the return on assets is decreasing in the amount of liquid assets held. As a 
consequence, the decision to increase the proportion of assets held in liquid form will reduce 
the growth rate of the firm. Stated in another way holding liquid assets inside the firm as 
opposed to paying them out and making them available for current consumption reduces the 
value of the (cum dividend) value of the firm. Thus the first best rule in these circumstances 
is to hold no liquid assets. This will imply that the levered firm enters bankruptcy almost 
surely. (This is the consequence of the cash flow process having unbounded variation.) 
However, in the absence of bankruptcy costs, this involves no loss of cash flows -- cash flow 
rights simply are transferred from old equity holders to debt holders who become the new 
shareholders.  
 
The policy that maximizes the value of shares will in general differ from this first best 
policy. Finding this policy involves solving a dynamic programming problem with two state 
variable, the current drift of the cash flow process,  t ρ , and the current level of liquid asset 
holdings,  t C .  The dividend payout policy is given by  t t dC Idt dS − − .  Notice that we do 
not impose any cost of changing dividend policy from one moment to the next. Then in this 
setting we can apply fundamental results from the theory of controlled Brownian motion to 
note that the optimal dividend policy will be to payout all available cash flow and liquid 
assets in excess of a critical amount and to retain all available cash flows if liquid asset 
holdings are less than this critical amount. (See, Dutta and Radner (1999)). Specifically, a 
basic property of the model is: 
 
                                                 
6 The return on the firm's liquid assets may be strictly less than the risk-free rate if their availability creates 
agency problems of the sort described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) or Myers and Rajan (1998). 
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Proposition 1: There is a critical level of cash holdings,  ) ( * t C ρ , such that if the 
current level expected cash flow rate is  t ρ  the firm will pay out all available liquid 
assets in excess of  ) ( * t C ρ  as dividends and if liquid assets are currently less than 
) ( * t C ρ  the firm will pay no dividends and will retain all cash flow in excess of debt 
service and other fixed charges in order to accumulate additional liquid assets. 
 
It is important to point out that an implication of this proposition is that when cash flow 
tends to be high (high  t ρ ) there will generally be a dividend paid which will fluctuate with 
movements of cash flows. In this high cash flow region the liquid asset holdings will be 
maintained close to the critical level  ) ( * t C ρ  and will change only as the rate of expected 
cash flows  ) ( t ρ changes. In contrast, when expected cash flows are low (i.e., low t ρ ), then 
there will generally be a zero dividend and liquid asset holdings will fluctuate in step with 
cash flows. In this latter region, observed liquid asset holding ( t C ) may be far less than 
desired levels of liquid asset holding, ( ) ( * t C ρ ).  
 
The solution of the optimal policy in this context consists in characterizing the critical level 
of liquid asset holding  ) ( * t C ρ  for all possible expected rates of cash flows. This is a 
complicated dynamic programming problem, which we have solved numerically. Some 
important characteristics of the solution can be seen in the graph where we have plotted 
) ( * t C ρ  as a function of  t ρ  under specific parametric assumptions. In this graph we have 
represented the solution for a ‘low debt’ case, which is given by the dotted line, and for a 
‘high debt’ case given by the solid line. In the high debt case the parameter I is 50% higher 









In examining the low debt case (the dotted line) notice that the optimal level of liquid asset 
holdings is a decreasing function of expected cash flows over the region of relatively high 
expected cash flows. The intuition for this is that, given that the currently high cash flows are   7
likely to persist, the prospect of financial distress is relatively remote. The firm need not 
carry very high levels of liquid assets. However, should expected cash flows begin to drop 
the shareholders will begin to target higher levels of liquid asset holding as a precaution 
against a time when cash flows will fall short of contractual costs. Note however that the 
optimal liquid asset holding is an increasing function of expected cash flows in the region of 
low expected cash flows. The reason is that if expected cash flows are low relative to costs 
(Idt) then the likelihood is that available liquid assets will be drawn down during the period 
of firm poor performance. At some point the shareholders decide that prospects of the firm 
are too poor and that it is better to pay out a large fraction of liquid assets as dividends. In so 
doing, they willingly increase the likelihood of insolvency and therefore sacrifice future 
dividends. We can summarize this discussion in, 
 
Proposition 2: There is a critical level of expected cash flows, 
)) ( * max( arg * t C ρ ρ = , such that for  * ρ ρ < t , the critical level of liquid assets 
) ( * t C ρ is weakly increasing in the expected cash flow and for  * ρ ρ > t the critical 
level ) ( * t C ρ is weakly decreasing in the expected cash flow. 
 
Notice that the non-monotonicity of the relation between optimal liquid asset holding and 
expected cash flows suggests that there will be no simple empirical relationship between 
observed cash flows and the level of liquid asset holding. If realized cash flow and liquid 
asset holdings were observed for a firm over an extended period of time it would not be 
surprising to find a positive correlation or a negative correlation or no significant correlation 
at all.  
 
If we compare the graphs of the critical liquid assets for low debt (dotted curve) and high 
debt (solid curve), we notice that the critical level of cash flows is higher for the high debt 
firm than for the low debt firm,  H L * * ρ ρ < . Furthermore, for expected cash flows greater 
than the critical level for the high debt firm, t H ρ ρ < * , the target level of cash holdings for 
the high debt firm exceeds that of the low debt firm,  ) ( * ) ( * t L t H C C ρ ρ > .  If we combine 
this fact with the observation made above that in the range of relatively high expected cash 
flows actual liquid asset holdings are typically close to target holdings whereas for relatively 
low expected cash flows actual liquid assets holdings are generally far less than target 
holdings we arrive at an important empirical implication of this analysis. Everything else 
equal high levels of debt tend to be associated with high levels of liquid asset holdings.  
 
In this section we have limited our discussion to the simplest version of our continuous time 
model of corporate liquid asset holding in order to highlight the implications of the model 
for changes in financial structure, the level of liquid asset holdings and the return of assets 
for the firm.
7  For reasons of limitation of space we have not presented the technicalities 
involved in solving this model and we have not explored its full implications. For example, 
the model allows us to consider the effect of increasing cash flow volatility, σ , the mean 
                                                 
7 It is worth pointing out how this analysis differs from those of Kim et.al. and Morellec discussed in Section 3. 
Kim et.al. model is static in nature. The motivation for holding liquidity is to avoid issuing costly debt in order 
to pursue growth opportunities that arise. There is nothing comparable to the precautionary motive that we have 
emphasized. Morellec model is dynamic in nature, but his analysis of the liquidation decision is static. 
Specifically, he allows for a one-time asset sale. In contrast, our analysis allows for liquid assets to be sold or to 
be accumulated freely at all times. This is a more complicated problem which results in the fact that we need to 
solve it numerically.  8
cash flow rate, ρ  ,  or the volatility of the expected cash flow rate, η.  Furthermore, with a 
slight modification to allow for debt related corporate tax shields, the framework could be 
used to derive the optimal capital structure.  
 
 
4. Empirical tests 
 
4.1 Hypotheses to be tested. 
 
The analysis of the preceding section has served to demonstrate a link between capital 
structure and firm liquidity, which we believe has been overlooked in previous discussions 
of the determinants of firm liquidity. It is this predicted positive relationship between 
leverage and liquidity that we will focus on in our empirical analysis.  
 
However, we recognize that leverage may be only one of the factors that determine a firm’s 
choice of liquid asset holdings. Some other factors are suggested by other factors that appear 
explicitly in our model. In particular, we would expect asset volatility to be positively 
associated with liquid asset holding everything else equal.  
 
There are very likely other important factors affecting the choice of liquid assets even though 
it has not been possible to incorporate them into our analysis. Foremost among these is the 
presence of growth opportunities which we would expect to be positively associated with 
liquid asset holding. The testing methodology we adopt should be careful to control for these 
additional affects appropriately.  
 
In our review of the literature on the firm’s choice of liquid asset holdings, we have 
discussed the two recent empirical studies that are closest to our study (Kim, Mauer and 
Sherman (1998) and Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999)). It is useful to 
summarize the findings of these studies and to compare them to our predictions based on the 
model we have summarized in Section 3 and the out-of-model predictions that we find 
unexceptionable. The following table does this: 
 
Table 1: Factors determining liquid asset holdings 
Variable Kim  et.al.finding  Opler et.al. finding  Our prediction 
Cash flow  -  +  Ambiguous 
Growth opportunities  +  +  + 
Volatility +  +  + 
Leverage -  -  + 
Bankruptcy risk  -  n.a.  Ambiguous  
Firm size  n.a.  -  n.a. 
 
Notice that the Kim et.al. study finds a negative effect of cash flow on liquid asset holding 
and that Opler et.al. find a positive relation. This apparent puzzle is in some sense resolved 
by our model which points out explicitly that the relation between cash flow (understood as a 
proxy for expected cash flow) and liquidity is non-monotonic.  The previous studies agree in 
finding positive relations with respect to growth opportunities and volatility and are 
consistent with our predictions.    9
 
The major difference between the previous studies and our predictions concerns the effect of 
leverage. Both previous studies found a negative effect; whereas, our prediction is of a 
positive effect. It should be noted that leverage was included in the earlier studies as a 
control and the authors provided no detailed rationale for the negative sign obtained. 
Furthermore, the earlier studies employed measures of leverage that aggregated debt of all 
maturities. In U.S. corporate financial structures short-term debt tends to predominate. In 
contrast, the formal model we described in Section 3 was based on the assumption that debt 
was long-term (indeed perpetual). As a result, we should be alert to the fact that the design of 
the previous empirical studies may not have been suited to testing our predictions. We will 
try to deal with this by including measures of both long-term and short-term debt in our 
analysis.  
 
Finally, we should point out that one of the puzzling findings of the Kim et.al. study was that 
bankruptcy risk had a negative effect on liquid asset holdings. The measure of bankruptcy 
risk they employed was based on the Altman z-score which includes a variety of financial 
ratios that are positively correlated with cash-flow. Therefore, we note that the non-
monotonicity result of our model suggests that this relationship may not necessarily be a 




4.2   Tests based on a panel of UK firms 
 
Our first empirical estimates are based on an unbalanced panel data set of listed UK firms. 
The focus on listed firms is motivated by several considerations. First, these firms tend to be 
larger firms which would tend to have access to long-term debt finance. Second, these firms 
would tend to be those for which more reliable estimates of R&D expenditures (one of our 
proxies for growth options) are available. Finally, for these listed firms it is possible to 
calculate the ratio of market value to book value which may be an alternative indicator of 
growth options. 
 
The data set is drawn from Datastream consisting of financial variables of non-financial 
firms included in the FTSE All Shares index in 2001. Our data is covers the annual reports 
over a maximum of 12 years per firm, 1989 through 2001.  
 
Using the FTSE all shares index means that we cover large and medium sized firms based in 
the U.K. The fact that we have used firms that were in existence in 2001 creates a possible 
survivorship bias. Some of the firms that have disappeared from the sample may have done 
so through mergers. It is sometimes stated that highly liquid firms are attractive takeover 
targets. Our data will not allow us to identify this effect. Other firms may have disappeared 
through bankruptcy or distressed reorganization. Our model suggests that the choice of 
liquid asset holding by distressed firms (low  t ρ ) will be very different from that of firms 
under normal conditions. To the extent that the construction of our data set excludes 
distressed firms, this means that our results are better characterizations of firms under normal 
operating conditions.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the definitions of the variables used in our study of UK firms. The 
definitions we have adopted for liquid assets, cash flow, R&D, and market to book are 10
directly comparable to the definitions used by Kim et.al. and Opler et.al. As in their studies 
the dependent variable of our regression analysis is liqurat, the total liquid asset holding of 
the firm expressed as a fraction of total assets. Note that all variables have been divided by a 
scale indicator in order to reduce problems of heteroscedasticity. 
 
 
Table 2: Data definitions 
liqurat  Liquid asset  Sum of cash, bank balances, and investments in current assets 
divided by total assets 
cfratio  Cash flow   Earnings before taxes and interest divided by total assets 
ltlev  Long term debt  Debt greater than 5 years to maturity divided by total assets 
mtlev Medium  term 
debt 
Debt greater than 1 year and less than 5 years to maturity 
divided by total assets 
stlev  Short term debt  Debt payable within 1 year divided by total assets 
rdratio R&D 
expenditures 
Expenditures on R&D divided by total sales 
MTBV  Market value to 
book value 
Market value divided by net tangible assets, market value is 
share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares 
outstanding; net tangible assets is ordinary shareholder's equity 
less intangible assets. 
 
 
R&D expenditures and market to book ratio are included as a proxies for the firm’s growth 
opportunities. In our view R&D is the preferred variable in that the link to growth appears to 
be the clearest. Its drawback is that not all firms report R&D expenditures. As a result, we 
have included market to book ratio which can be calculated for a larger set of firms. This 
variable is not ideal because high market to book may be indicative conditions favorable to 
the firm that have nothing to do with its future growth opportunities.  
 
Unlike previous studies we distinguish long-term and short-term debt. UK financial reports 
are unusual in that they include indicators of debts with at least five years to maturity. Thus 
to clearly focus on the predictions of our model concerning debt as a persistent feature of the 
firm’s capital structure we take long-term debt to be at least five years and short term years 
to be debt of a maximum maturity of one year. As an additional control we do some 
estimations including medium term debt (between one and five years).  
 
In examining summary statistics for the variables included in our analysis it was noted that 
some implausibly high or low values of variable were observed. These may well reflect data 
errors. We deal with this by working with a truncated sample where the data points involving 
the smallest percentile or largest percentile of a variable are excluded.  
 
In addition to the variables we have listed we have included in the analysis dummy variables 
for industrial categories and year of observation. We have also explored the effect of 
alternative definitions of leverage (including trade credit), lagged values of explanatory 
variables, and measures of cash flow volatility. It is not possible to present all these 
estimates here. Generally, we have found that industry dummies and year dummies are 
significant. Furthermore, once these industry dummies are included the estimated effect of 
volatility is not significant; although, this variable is significant when industry dummies are 
excluded. The inclusion of lagged regressors did not produce any systematic or interesting 
dynamics. The sign and significance of these variables were sensitive to exact specification   11
and estimation method. There inclusion had little effect on the sign and significance of the 
contemporaneous regressors. Therefore we report the results excluding these lagged 
regressors.  
 
We have estimated the linear regression model between liquidity ratio and the explanatory 
variables we have listed. We have estimated this relation by Ordinary Least Squares. 
Furthermore, given the nature of our data set it is interesting to estimate the model using 
panel study techniques. A limitation of these techniques is that often the length of the panel 
is often too short to yield powerful results. In our case, we have a maximum of 11 years of 
data for a given firm. We consider this sufficient to make these techniques potentially 
interesting. We report results for both firm fixed effects and random effects versions of our 
models.  
  
4.3 UK Results 
 
Table 3 reports the results of the ordinary least squares regressions of the model based on the 
sample of UK firms described in the preceding section. Columns 1 presents the estimates 
including indicators for long-term and short-term leverage and using R&D expenditures as a 
proxy for growth opportunities. Since R&D is our preferred proxy for growth we view this 
regression as a benchmark for comparison with other results. Cash flow enters with positive 
sign and is significant.  
 
Table 3: UK Firms, trimmed sample, OLS regressions, dependent 
variable liquidity ratio (t-statistics under parameter estimates) 
cfratio  0.104065 0.023521 .1343059 .0748854 
  2.683 0.879  3.450 2.702 
        
ltlev 0.255896  0.057081  .262579  .0546408 
  5.389 1.715 5.567 1.627 
        
mtlev     -.1330946  -.1540377 
     -2.919  -5.196 
        
stlev -0.0098  -0.03638  -.0258692  -.0400304 
 -0.198  -0.99  -0.517  -1.075 
        
rdratio 0.45305  .4320407   
 7.702    7.424   
        
MTBV   0.000778    .000659 
   2.743   2.294 
        
year 
dummies  yes yes yes yes 
        
industry 
dummies yes  yes  yes 
 
yes 
        
Adjusted R
2 0.1871  0.1223  .2003 .1546 
        
Number of 
observation
s 929  1780  892  1692   
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Long term leverage has a positive coefficient which is highly significant. This is consistent 
with the prediction of our theoretical model. Short-term leverage enters with a negative sign 
but is insignificant. R&D spending is positive and highly significant.  The industry dummies 
taken as a whole are significant. The same applies to the year dummies taken as a whole. 
 
Column 2 differs from column 1 in that market to book ratio is taken as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. This regression is estimated on a larger data set since a large number of firms 
in the UK sample do not report expenditures on R&D spending. The results are consistent 
with the estimates of column 1. The proxy for growth opportunities enters with positive sign 
and is significant. The other variables enter with the same signs as in column 1. However, 
cash flow and short-term leverage are insignificant and long-term leverage is only 
marginally significant.  
 
Columns 3 and 4 differ from columns 1 and 2 in that they include medium leverage (based 
on debt with 1 to 5 years maturity) in the regression. In both cases this variable enters with 
negative sign and is significant. Otherwise the pattern of estimates is similar to that seen in 
columns 1 and 2. Long-term leverage has a positive coefficient and is highly significant in 
the regression where R&D is a proxy for growth opportunities. When market to book is used 
to control for growth opportunities this variable still has a positive effect, but it is no longer 
significant.  In both columns 3 and 4 short-term leverage enters with negative sign but is 
insignificant. Growth opportunities (R&D or market to book) enter positively and are 
significant.  
 
The major finding from Table 3 is that other things equal, greater long-term debt is 
associated firms setting higher target levels of liquid assets. This is consistent with the theory 
of the choice of liquid assets we have elaborated above. Furthermore, these results raise 
doubts about the finding of previous studies which a negative relationship between firm 
liquidity and firm indebtedness. In our data set short-term leverage entered negatively into 
the relation and was insignificant. Medium term leverage entered negatively and was 
significant. These results suggest that firms may view long-term debt and short-term debt 
very differently. Long-term debt may reflect a durable feature of the firm’s capital structure 
to which other policies, such as dividend and liquid asset holding are adapted.  Short-term 
debt can be used more actively and may be substitutable for liquid asset holding.  
 
In the regression analysis reported in Table 3 there is a risk that there are determinants of 
liquid asset choice beyond the measures of leverage, cash flow, and growth opportunities 
that we have explicitly introduced. We have attempted to control other possible factors by 
including dummy variables for time and the industry of the firm. These may be imperfect 
controls. The panel structure of our data set allows us to take an alternative approach by 
allowing for firm specific effects which are either constant over time (fixed effects) or are 
drawn randomly each year from a fixed distribution (random effects). In Table 4 we report 
the result of applying these panel techniques to our baseline model specifications which 
include leverage measures, cash flow, growth option proxies, and dummies for industry and 




Table 4: UK firms, panel estimates, trimmed sample, dependent variable 










       
Cfratio  .0817506 .0421787 .0134804 -.0108182 
 2.089    0.972  0.500  -0.362 
     
Ltlev  .158416  .1359057 .0558594 .0877992 
 3.340  2.672  1.670    2.398 
     
Stlev  -.1024555 -.1285672 -.1297774 -.1422015 
  -2.126 -2.477   -3.750  -3.800 
     
Rdratio .4812984 .4959705     
 8.406    7.682    
     
MTBV    .0002276  .000015 
   0.915  0.055 
     
year 
dummies  yes yes yes yes 
     
Industry 
dummies  yes yes yes yes 
     
Haussman 
test  (p-value)  0.0370   0.0106  
     
Number of 
obs 928 928 1777  1777 
 
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 presents the panel estimates based on R&D spending as a proxy 
for growth opportunities. The results of the Haussman test suggest that the fixed effects 
regression is the preferred specification; however, the coefficient estimates are similar in the 
two specifications. Long-term leverage enters with a positive sign and is significant. 
Interestingly, short-term leverage enters negatively and is significant in both specifications. 
Cash flow enters positively. It is significant in the random effects version of the model but 
not in the fixed effects version. As expected R&D enters positively and is highly significant 
in both the random effects and fixed effects versions of the model. is no longer significant. 
Short-term leverage has a negative coefficient and is significant. The market to book ratio 
enters positively but is insignificant. This tends to confirm our reservations expressed about 
this measure as a proxy for growth opportunities. Finally, cash flow enters positively in the 
random effects version of the model but negatively in the fixed effects version. In both cases 
it is insignificant.  
 
The results of these panel estimates tend to confirm the main conclusions tentatively reached 
on the basis of the OLS regressions. We find significant evidence of a positive relationship 
between long-term leverage and liquid asset holding. This is consistent with the presence of 
a precautionary motive for holding liquid assets for firms that maintain high leverage as a 
durable feature of their capital structure. Beyond this there seems to be evidence of a 14
negative relationship between short-term leverage and asset liquidity. This suggests that 
short term debt and liquid asset holding may be substitutes in the sense that a firm facing 
persistently low cash flows will respond either by drawing down available liquid assets or by 
accumulating short term debt or both.  
 
Another point that emerges from our analysis of the panel data set of UK firms is that the 
relationship between cash flow and liquid asset holding does not appear to be stable or 
robust. In the results reported here as well as in our experiments with alternative 
specifications of the model, we found that the estimate of the cash flow were sometime 
positive, sometimes negative and often insignificant. Our theoretical analysis of Section 3 
suggests that this should not be surprising.  
  
4.4  Testing based on a panel of Belgian firms 
 
To further study the determinants of the firm’s choice of liquid asset holding we have 
extended our analysis to an unbalanced panel data set of listed Belgian firms. This is based 
on the annual financial reports of Belgian firms for 1986 through 1999 as compiled by the 
National Bank of Belgium. From this data set we have selected non-financial firms that have 
been listed on the Belgian stock exchange. As in the case of the UK data, the focus on listed 
firms meant that we have studied relatively large firms which had access to capital markets 
and which might provide data on R&D spending (our main proxy for growth opportunities). 
It should be noted that by excluding non-financial firms we have excluded many of the 
largest Belgian firms which collectively have represented a large share of Belgium’s total 
market capitalization.  
 
In order to aid comparability of results we have tried to work with variables that are as close 
as possible to those we have used in our UK data base. In most cases the correspondence is 
close, but several differences should be noted.  Most importantly, Belgian financial reports 
define short-term debt as payable within one year and all other debt considered long-term. 
Thus there is no measure directly comparable that for the UK which indicated debts of 
greater than five years.  
 
In comparing Belgian and British measure of firm debt’s we are alerted to possible 
ambiguities in what is meant by long-term and short-term debt. For example, if a firm has 
negotiated a revolving credit facility, by drawing upon the facility it may create a short-term 
liability even though maintaining some relatively high level of this liability may be a 
permanent feature of its capital structure.  
 
Another feature of the NBB data set is that it does not include measures of the market value 
of the equity. Therefore, we have been unable to use market to book ratio as a proxy for 
growth opportunities. Given our conceptual reservations about this measure and the rather 
unstable results obtained for it in the UK data set, we do not consider this a major limitation 
of our study of Belgian firms.  
 
 
As with our study of UK firms estimate the linear regression model of the determinants of 
the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Estimates are obtained both by the method of 
ordinary least squares and by panel methods. In studying the descriptive statistics of our 
variables we have found evidence of outliers, which might be attributable to reporting or   15
coding errors. All the results we report are based on the trimmed sample with these apparent 
outliers eliminated. 
 
4.5  Belgian results 
 
Before attempting to explain the determinant of liquidity, it is useful to point out an 
important apparent difference between our UK and Belgian data sets. Table 5 reports the 
quartiles of the distribution of liquidity ratio for these two data sets. Based on these data we 
see that the level of liquid asset holding of Belgian listed non-financial companies appears to 
be considerably higher than that of their UK counterparts. For example, the median liquid 
asset holding is 11% in Belgium versus 7% in the UK. The high end of the distribution is 
quite surprising. About 25% of Belgian non-financial firms hold at least 23% of their assets 
in liquid form. In contrast, the top quartile of UK firms holds at least 14% of their assets in 
liquid form. These observations are sufficient to point out that liquid asset holding even for 
industrial and commercial firms can be quite substantial.  
 
 
Table 5: Comparisons of corporate liquidity (ratio of liquid assets to 
total assets) 
 25
th percentile  median 75
th percentile 
UK 0.034  0.074  0.140 
Belgium 0.048  0.111  0.233 
 
 
The results of estimating the linear model of the determinants of liquid asset holding are 
reported in Table 6. Column 1 is devoted to variables included in the regressions are the 
same for each column. The columns differ with respect to estimation method. Otherwise the 
specifications of the models are identical.  
 
We find a positive and significant relationship between the level of liquid asset holding and 
growth opportunities as proxied by R&D spending. We also find a positive and significant 
relationship with respect to short term leverage. In contrast, we find that long-term leverage 
enters negatively and is insignificant once firm effects (either fixed or random) are 
introduced to the regression. Cash flow ratio enters negatively in the OLS estimates but 




Table 6: Belgian firms, Trimmed-sample regressions, 
dependent variable liquidity ratio (t-statistics or z-statistics 




 The main apparent difference between the results we have obtained for Belgian firms and 
those we obtained UK data set is the reversal of sign patterns for long-term and short-term 
leverage. There is no obvious or simple accounting for this. One possible source of 
discrepancy that we have already noted is that long-term liabilities coming due in one year or 
more for Belgian data whereas in the UK data set it pertains to debts greater than 5 years. 
However, it is not clear why this difference, in itself, explains the fact that short-term debt is 
positively associated with liquid asset holding in Belgium; whereas, in the UK it is long-term 
debt that is positively associated with leverage. Rather, it seems that our results point to 
some other institutional differences between the Belgian and UK contexts that are masked by 
the standard accounting definitions.  
 
We have already mentioned the potential problem that a long-term revolving credit facility 
might be recorded as short-term debt even though it is a permanent feature of the firm’s 
capital structure. Thus if this kind of arrangement more prevalent in Belgium as compared to 
the UK we might better understand why in Belgium it appears that short-term debt creates a 
strong precautionary motive for liquid asset holding. Unfortunately, our data does not allow 
us to determine whether this conjecture is correct. Therefore, this issue must await further 
study for clarification.  
 
Finally, we note that in Table 6 the cash flow variable enters negatively in the OLS 
regression. In the panel estimates the sign of this variable becomes positive. This apparent 
  OLS  Fixed effects  Random Effects 
Cfratio  -.00686  .14574  .13186 
  2.06  3.53  1.94 
      
Ltlev  -.26516  -.04239  -.07017 
  -6.12  -0.90  -1.56 
      
Stlev  .22697  .22427  .21859 
  5.88  5.59  5.67 
      
Rdratio  .63488  1.5258  1.2858 
  1.60  2.61  2.40 
      
year dummies  yes  yes  yes 
      
industry dummies  yes  yes  yes 
      
Adjusted R
2  0.8674    
      
Number of observations  888  888  888 
Haussman text (p-value)     0.9528  17
sensitivity of this variable to changes of specification or estimation method was observed 






It is useful to summarize the main stylised facts about corporate liquid asset holdings that 
emerge from the analysis of the preceding sections. First, within the universe of non-
financial firms there are substantial differences across firms and across countries in the 
proportion of assets that are held in liquid form. Second, there appears to be a strong and 
robust positive relationship between the presence of growth opportunities and corporate 
liquidity. Third, cash flow volatility appears to be positively associated with liquid asset 
holding. Fourth, there does not appear to be a stable or robust relationship between cash flow 
and corporate liquidity. Fifth, US studies a negative relation between leverage and corporate 
liquidity; whereas, our studies of British and Belgian firms found evidence of a positive 
relationship between leverage and corporate liquidity.   
 
This last observation highlights an issue that deserves further careful study. Our analysis of 
Belgian and UK firms shows that for the purposes of understanding corporate liquidity it is 
very important to differentiate debt according to maturity. The US studies used measures of 
leverage which combined debts of all maturities. Thus, it would be very interesting to 
reconsider the US data studied by Kim et.al. and Opler et.al. allowing for long-term and 
short-term leverage. Furthermore, it would be interesting to study the implications for 
corporate liquidity of finer indicators of capital structure, e.g., bank versus other debt, use of 
callable debt, or convertibles. 
 
Thus our understanding of the way capital structure impacts corporate holding of liquid 
assets is still incomplete. Nevertheless, we believe that analysis in this paper clearly raises 
the possibility of an important precautionary motive for corporate liquidity in environments 
where access to external capital is costly. In particular, we have identified a channel that 
operates as follows: Liquidity grants a survival option to the shareholders of the levered 
firm. Consequently, these shareholders will choose a higher level of asset liquidity than 
would maximize the value of the firm. In so doing, they reduce the rate of return on assets 
and the growth of the firm. This effect is more pronounced the greater is the leverage used 
by the firm. Furthermore, it is more pronounced the more rigid is the financial structure and 
the more costly is accessing external financial markets.  
 
In this section we draw out some of the possible implications of this channel. In this regard 
our analysis adds to the work on international comparisons of financial development as a 
determinant of differences in economic growth rates. In that literature, the study that most 
clearly links differences in corporate growth to the institutions of the financial sector is that 
of Rajan and Zingales (1999).  That study did not specifically explore the channel that we 
have identified here. However, implicitly their earlier international comparison capital 
structure (Rajan and Zingales (1995)) did produce some results that are suggestive that this 
channel may be important. In particular, in that study they found when leverage is measured 
as non-equity liabilities divided by total assets, “the Anglo-American economies have 
considerably lower median leverage in 1991 (about 0.56) than companies in Continental 
Europe and Japan (0.70).” (Rajan and Zingales (1995), p. 1429).  However, when they 18
deduct liquid asset holding from non-equity liabilities, they find that the leverage levels are 
similar across the countries. If anything Germany emerges as a low level country. By 
implication high leverage is associated with high levels of liquid assets. 
 
We still do not have a complete understanding of what accounts for differences in leverage 
or other aspects of financial structure across countries. The study of Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) suggest that the traditional break-down between bank-based and market-based 
systems is at best only a crude explanation of observed differences. It is likely that 
differences tax incentives and ownership patterns (e.g. family and interlinked coalitions of 
investors versus dispersed ownership) account for more of these differences. Our 
highlighting the presence of a structure-liquidity-growth linkage brings an additional 
dimension to observations about institutional differences across financial systems. 
 
Regarding the difference between bank-based versus market-based systems, our analysis 
suggests that a crucial aspect of financial structure will be the flexibility that it affords the 
firm in dealing with periods of cash flow short-fall. If close relationships to creditors mean 
that firms will be able to access additional credit during these periods, then this softens the 
precautionary motive for corporate liquidity. While this may be a potential advantage of 
systems based on close banking relationships, the recent work by Edwards and Fischer on 
German financial systems raises doubts about whether the haus-bank relationship really 
affords this flexibility.  
 
Another important observation that has emerged from international comparisons of corporate 
financial practices is that some systems are characterised by structures that help to perpetuate 
the effective control over firms by family groups or other coalitions of investors. This 
appears to be what accounts for the prevalence of pyramids and interlinked ownership 
structures in some continental European systems. Our analysis points out a hidden 
implication of the reliance on debt finance in order to concentrate control rights over the firm 
in the hands of specific investors. If investor groups attempt retain control a firm through the 
heavy reliance on debt, they may be forced to maintaining a higher degree of asset liquidity 
than they would otherwise. In so doing they may be undermining the subsequent growth 
rates of the firm and condemning the firm to ultimate stagnation.  
 
Our analysis also puts the widely observed growth of European equity markets in a new 
light. If equity market development has effectively brought down the barriers to equity 
finance for a wider range of firms, this potentially could have an important and long-lasting 
impact on the growth potential of these firms. If this source of finance effectively reduces the 
observed leverage levels, it also reduces the precautionary incentive for corporate liquidity. 
Firms may be freer in channelling their available cash flow into riskier positive NPV 
investment opportunities. Furthermore, our analysis points out one of the favourable 
consequences of equity based finance is that it can be growth promoting even if new equity 
issuance is not the direct source of finance for risky projects. By simply creating a structure 
whereby retentions can be channelled into risky projects rather than low return liquid assets, 
firm growth is promoted.  
 
While our empirical analysis has focused on listed firms for reasons of data reliability, the 
capital structure-liquidity-growth channel we have identified can be at least as important for 
smaller firms with strong growth potential. Our analysis suggests that the environment may 
be seriously growth inhibiting if the only effective means of financing growth at early stages 
of the firm is through debt. For with increased leverage brings a stronger liquidity bias thus   19
potentially reducing the growth trajectory of the firm. In this regard, the emergence of 
private equity and venture capital are potentially very important developments for the growth 
of European firms. When these financing methods operate well, they can create much greater 
flexibility than traditional debt based financial structures. In so doing, they may allow the 
firm to operate with a smaller proportion of their assets tied up in liquid form. This can help 
in achieving higher average returns on assets and allow the firm to reach more quickly the 
stage where public equity issuance is feasible. In making this observation we do not wish to 
give the impression that these financial modes are a panacea for promoting economic 
growth. In practice the private equity financial structures impose tight constraints on the firm 
if the interests of investors are effectively protected (see Gilson 2000).  Nevertheless, we feel 
it is important to point out that adding these investment modes as an alternatives to straight 




In this paper we have identified a channel between financial structure and corporate growth 
which operates through the firm’s choice of liquid asset holding. We have developed this 
idea first through a theoretical analysis of a dynamic model of the firm’s choice of dividends 
and accumulation of liquid assets. In this model we see that the precautionary motive for 
corporate liquidity means that higher leverage will tend to be associated with higher average 
levels of liquid assets. We explore this idea empirically by studying two panel data sets, one 
based on UK listed firms and the other based on Belgian listed firms. The results revealed 
positive associations between leverage and liquid asset holding, thus running counter to 
previous studies based on US data which documented a negative relationship between total 
leverage and corporate liquidity. While reconciling these differences will require further 
study, our results clearly raise the prospect that the link between financial structure and 
corporate liquidity exits. In the final section of the paper we have drawn out the implications 
of this linkage and have identified some prominent features of the European financial 
landscape that may be seriously growth inhibiting while suggesting other features that may 
be growth promoting. These observations are necessarily somewhat speculative in nature. It 
is hope that the present paper will help to stimulate further study of these issues, as we 
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